Thought leaders among U.S. allies and partners are equally concerned about Huawei as Americans. More than two-thirds of those surveyed think their country should ban Huawei’s entry into their 5G market, with 30% of those also supporting a ban on trade in telecom components.

CSIS | Allies & Partners Q19

By the Numbers

  • 44%

    of respondents from Quad member countries besides the U.S. (Australia, India, Japan) support blocking Huawei and other Chinese firms from their 5G markets and banning trade in telecom components to those companies.

  • 37%

    of thought leaders in Asia and Europe support banning Huawei from their 5G markets but want to continue trading telecom components to those companies.

Thought leaders among U.S. allies and partners are equally concerned about Huawei as Americans. More than two-thirds of those surveyed think their country should ban Huawei’s entry into their 5G market, with 30% of those also supporting a ban on trade in telecom components.

Overall, this tracks with U.S. thought leaders: 35% support blocking Huawei from the 5G market and banning all U.S. exports of high-tech components to Chinese companies, while 20% believe the United States should block Huawei but still allow U.S. firms to continue trade in high-tech components.


Like U.S. thought leaders, there is more readiness to accept decoupling in tech and much less readiness to accept a broader economic decoupling, including in trade in goods and services or tourism. On a scale of 1–10 where "1" means "best to pursue full decoupling from China" and "10" means "best to move for deeper economic integration," the mean response from U.S. allies and partners on "R&D, trade, and investment in advanced technologies" is 4.40—more toward decoupling. On the other hand, the mean response on "Chinese tourism in their country" is 6.22, and the mean response on "trade in agriculture, manufactured goods, and services" is 6.26—more toward economic integration. Views are more mixed on direct investment and regional supply chains: the mean for "Chinese direct investment in their country" is 4.64; the mean for "their country’s direct investment in China" is 5.37; and the mean for "regional supply chains" is 5.82.


The widest variation was within South and Southeast Asia: Indians and Vietnamese are most willing to lean toward decoupling across the board (overall means of 3.95 and 4.51, respectively), while Singaporeans, Thais, and Malaysians are more in favor of maintaining closer economic ties (overall means of 7.15, 7.06, and 6.84, respectively). A recent CSIS survey of Southeast Asian thought leaders showed that a majority of respondents from Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia view China’s role as beneficial to the region.


Survey respondents from "Quad" member countries besides the United States (Australia, India, and Japan) are most supportive of banning technology exports to China for 5G, with 44% in favor of banning trade in telecom components and 41% in favor of continuing trade in telecom components. Europeans are somewhat less supportive of banning exports of components, with 46% of European allies and partners supporting continued trade in telecom components. The most advanced semiconductors needed by Chinese firms such as Huawei are manufactured in the United States, Korea, Japan, and Taiwan.


There is strong support for banning Huawei among European countries, which could form the basis for a broader alliance on the digital economy. Thought leaders in the United Kingdom are the least forward-leaning, which seems out of step with recent government efforts to forge a "D-10" alliance (of the G7 countries plus Australia, South Korea, and India) on 5G and increased sensitivity toward China in the parliament, as evidenced by the recent establishment of a China Research Group to assess the challenges posed by China’s rise.


Among Italian respondents, 57% favor banning Huawei from the 5G market but continuing trade in high-tech components, a somewhat surprising result given that Italy joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative and that Italian respondents are most likely to prefer neutrality in the U.S.-China confrontation. This result on technology competition may point to preferences on industrial policy rather than China policy per se.


Consistent with U.S. thought leaders, U.S. allies and partners in Europe and Asia overwhelmingly believe the best way to deal with China on the economy is through multilateral agreements (65%) rather than unilateral measures (7%) or relying on the market (7%). Most of our European allies—France (76%), Germany (79%), and Italy (86%)—and treaty allies in East Asia—Japan (75%) and South Korea (74%)—are significantly higher in their support to use multilateral agreements. Two countries in Southeast Asia, Malaysia (75%) and Thailand (78%), also significantly support multilateral agreements.


Economies where respondents are significantly more willing to decouple from China include Taiwan (38%) and Vietnam (42%), where there has long been concern about overdependence on China.


The 2014 CSIS survey of Asian thought leaders also revealed strong support for multilateral frameworks. When asked about the importance of various economic frameworks to their country’s economic future, respondents ranked the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and the Group of 20 (G-20) highest, with 82% considering them either somewhat or very important, followed by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Economic Community (81%) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, or TPP (75%).