There is strong consensus among thought leaders in Asia and Europe that the United States is prepared to take risk to defend Japan (mean score of 6.89); Taiwan (6.42); South Korea (6.39); and Australia (6.16) against threats from China, but there is less consensus on defending an unnamed ally or partner in the South China Sea (5.43), though Northeast Asian countries (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) are generally more confident (6.14).

Evaluated on a scale of "1 – Take no risk" to "10 – Take significant risk"
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CSIS | Allies & Partners Q4-8

By the Numbers

  • 6.89

    U.S. allies and partners think the U.S. is most prepared to take risk to defend Japan (mean response on a scale of 1-10).

  • 8.09

    South Korean respondents are most confident that the United States will defend Japan (mean response on a scale of 1-10).

There is strong consensus among thought leaders in Asia and Europe that the United States is prepared to take risk to defend Japan (mean score of 6.89); Taiwan (6.42); South Korea (6.39); and Australia (6.16) against threats from China, but there is less consensus on defending an unnamed ally or partner in the South China Sea (5.43), though Northeast Asian countries (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) are generally more confident (6.14).

This potentially sends a powerful message to China that U.S. allies and partners are confident that the United States will take risk to defend them despite Beijing’s efforts to chip away at that confidence.


Despite China’s growing anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, confidence in the U.S. willingness to take risk to defend Taiwan is high, second only to Japan and higher than confidence for defending U.S. treaty allies South Korea and Australia.


Confidence in the U.S. commitment among Japanese and South Korean respondents is high (overall means of 6.46 and 7.12, respectively). South Korean respondents are most confident that the United States will defend Japan (mean of 8.09), though Japanese respondents are also confident in the U.S. commitment to defend Japan (mean of 6.91). South Korean respondents are also the most confident that the United States will defend South Korea (mean of 7.28). In contrast, Japanese respondents are most confident that the United States will defend an unnamed ally or partner in the South China Sea (mean of 6.22).


However, Asian thought leaders’ confidence in the U.S. commitment to their defense is still below the high level of risk U.S. thought leaders said they were willing to take in defense of allies and partners. For "defend Japan," the mean for Japanese respondents is 6.91, compared to the U.S. thought leader mean of 8.86. For "defend Australia," the mean for Australian respondents is 6.42, compared to the U.S. thought leader mean of 8.71. The gap is smallest in the case of "defend South Korea," where the mean for South Korean respondents is 8.09, compared to the U.S. thought leader mean of 8.60. Though allies and partners express confidence overall, this gap suggests the United States can do more to reassure allies and partners.


Australian respondents believe the United States is less prepared to take risk to defend an ally or partner in the South China Sea (4.58) and Taiwan (5.88) compared to U.S. treaty allies (5.92 for South Korea, 6.42 for Australia, and 6.85 for Japan). This could suggest some concern in Australian circles about becoming entrapped in a U.S. conflict in the South China Sea or Taiwan crisis and might also reflect the relative lack of strategic dialogue on Taiwan between the U.S. and Australian strategic communities.


European confidence in the U.S. willingness to defend Taiwan is also relatively low, perhaps also reflecting a lack of familiarity with U.S. Taiwan policy. The same holds true for the South China Sea, though the United Kingdom has recently increased security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific and conducted a freedom of navigation operation near the disputed Paracel Islands in the South China Sea in 2018.